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Book Reviews
THE VANITY OF DOGMATIZING
BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING. Brian Z.
Tamanaha.1 Princeton University Press. 2010. Pp. xii + 252.
Cloth $70.00, Paper $24.95.
Marc O. DeGirolami

2

The year 1661 saw the publication of Joseph Glanvill’s The
Vanity of Dogmatizing, a polemic advocating an intellectual
break from Aristotle and the Schoolmen in favor of the sort of
empiricism that eventually came to fruition in the philosophy of
David Hume. Glanvill was deeply irritated by what he perceived
as the encrusted academic orthodoxies of his age: “The Disease
of our Intellectuals,” he railed, “is too great, not to be its own
[evidence]: And they that feel it not, are not less sick, but
3
stupidly so.” What was needed was a skeptical cast of mind—
thinkers who would shatter the tiresomely durable scholarly
categories of the past centuries. The entrenchment of certain
archetypical ways of knowing had led to the desiccation of
knowledge and eventually to its distortion. True knowledge, said
Glanvill, “requires an acuteness and intention to its discovery;
while verisimility . . . is an obvious sensible on either hand, and
4
affords a large and eas[y] field for loose [i]nquiry.”
The passing of academic generations often witnesses challenges to older scholarly categories in favor of the next best
1. Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
2. Assistant Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. I am grateful
to Brian Tamanaha for generous and thoughtful comments. Thanks also to William
Baude, Brian Bix, Samuel Bray, Rick Garnett, Orin Kerr, Mark Movsesian, Steven
Smith, Lawrence Solum, and the participants in the St. John’s Law School summer brown
bag series.
3. JOSEPH GLANVILL, THE VANITY OF DOGMATIZING: THE THREE ‘VERSIONS’
62 (Stephen Medcalf ed., Harvester Press 1970) (1661).
4. Id. at 64.
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thing. But it is rarer to see the attempted upending of an entire
way of thinking about a historical phenomenon whose existence
has achieved unspoken universal assent. In his book, Beyond the
Formalist-Realist Divide, Brian Tamanaha takes up Glanvill’s
mantle, and his target is one of the most deep-rooted
jurisprudential dichotomies of the last century: the concepts of
legal formalism and legal realism. The book aims “to free us
from the formalist-realist stranglehold,” an exercise that, it is
claimed, will allow “us [to] recover a sound understanding of
judging” (p. 3).
The book makes three contributions—historical, critical,
and theoretical. First, it convincingly resuscitates several unjustly
discredited figures in American legal history. Second, it offers
various perceptive criticisms of the way in which legal scholars
and commentators have distorted the views of their predecessors
for ideological and other ill-gotten gains. Third, it calls for the
repudiation of the formalist and realist categories in favor of
what the author touts as “balanced realism” (p. 6), which he
claims is both an accurate picture of the way that many judges
always have done and continue to do their work, and a
normatively attractive jurisprudential account.
This essay summarizes and praises the historical features of
the book in Part I. These are the best parts of a very good book.
In Part II, the essay explores Tamanaha’s interesting critical
reconstruction, one which attempts to explain why the
formalist/realist dichotomy achieved such salience in the face of
copious contrary historical evidence. In the context of assessing
the author’s critique, the essay expresses some reservations
about Tamanaha’s appeal to “balanced realism.” In specific, it
argues that Tamanaha’s ultimate reliance on the very scholarly
categories that he spends the bulk of his book debunking is
surprising and somewhat deflating. This recursive move suggests
that even after all the historical smudge-marks have been
identified and retouched, the best that can be done is resignation
to a kind of murky via media somewhere between formalism and
realism’s grosser excesses. The essay offers two interpretations
of Tamanaha’s backslide to “balanced realism,” which it calls the
metaphysical and the historicist interpretations.
What might all of this mean for legal scholarship? The
question is too large to be pursued in any detail here, but Part III
speculates about how adopting the metaphysical and historicist
modes in legal theory might influence one facet of constitutional
theory: originalist and living constitutionalist theories of
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interpretation. It is tentatively suggested that in light of the sorts
of systematic academic distortions that Tamanaha so adeptly
documents in the area of jurisprudence, the historicist mode,
though rarely pursued by legal theorists, offers a more promising
future for this debate in constitutional theory as well as for the
formalist/realist question itself.
I
The most successful portion of Tamanaha’s illuminating
study demonstrates that the so-called “legal formalists” of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been
consistently caricatured and mis-described (sometimes in bad
faith) by scholars of later periods. These distortions were often
absorbed uncritically—as if by rote—into subsequent academic
treatments of American legal history. Tamanaha uncovers
evidence that gives shape and texture to the historical portrait of
the formalists. He vanquishes the myth that they were
“mechanical” jurisprudes fixated on “finding” the law in some
sort of nebulous jurisprudential ether, and he shows them to
have been keenly aware of the realities of indeterminacy,
subjectivity, law’s non-autonomy as a discipline, and many other
insights of contemporary legal thought. Long-reviled jurists and
scholars, including Sir Henry Maine, Thomas Cooley, John
Dillon, James Carter, Joseph Beale, Christopher Tiedeman,
William Hammond, and Christopher Columbus Langdell, are
given well-earned makeovers by Tamanaha’s evidence. They are
shown to be thinkers in full; no longer robots with cartoonish
views, but complex and sophisticated minds.
Conversely, Tamanaha takes legal historians and theorists
of later periods to task for gross mischaracterizations of their
predecessors. Jerome Frank, Grant Gilmore, and Roscoe Pound
come off particularly poorly. Frank is shown to have wantonly
manipulated the writings of Maine and Beale by carefully
interposed ellipses and other shoddy academic sleight of hand.
Where Maine unequivocally asserted that the law was elastic,
that judges make law, and that few people then believed that the
law was “a complete, coherent, symmetrical body” (p. 14), Frank
made it appear that Maine had said precisely the opposite and
that lawyers in the 20th century continued to believe Maine’s
5
fantastic theories (p. 16).

5. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
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Gilmore’s description of a “Formal Style” of American law
in the post-Civil War period, in which as a rule people believed
that “law is a closed, logical system” and that a judges’ role was
to “discover[] what the true rules of law are and indeed always
6
have been” is exposed as a fallacy (p. 18). Tamanaha offers an
abundance of fin-de-siècle articles and statements in which
lawyers, scholars, and even judges openly acknowledge the
existence of “judicial legislation,” examples of which include
passages from arch-“formalist” historical jurists Cooley and
Dillon (pp. 19–20). In Gilmore’s telling, Benjamin Cardozo was
the great prophet of the “third age” of American law—legal
realism—auguring it with his revelation in The Nature of the
7
Judicial Process that judges “made law instead of merely
declaring it”; this position, according to Gilmore, “was widely
regarded as a legal version of hard-core pornography” at the
time (p. 21). In fact, Tamanaha shows that much of what
Cardozo wrote about judicial legislation was uncontroversial in
1921 and had been said repeatedly at least twenty years earlier
(pp. 21–22), though one should point out there is a difference
between a well-known and respected judge saying something
and someone else saying it. It is a pity that Tamanaha devotes
scant attention (p. 104) to Samuel Williston, a “formalist” giant
(unlike at least some of the figures Tamanaha resurrects) who
was also maltreated by Gilmore as a pedantic conceptualist
8
technician. In his autobiography and elsewhere, Williston acidly
remarked that the realists’ brash claims to having discovered the
fact of law’s indeterminacy and their clarion call that judges must
9
treat the law as “a means to social ends” were old news: “brave
10
men lived before Agamemnon.”
As for Pound’s influential 1908 article, “Mechanical
Jurisprudence,” which purported to attack the American
“jurisprudence of conceptions” in which “everything is reduced
to simple deduction” from procrustean, “predetermined” legal
11
ideas, this critique is shown to have been properly directed at a
foreign theoretical construct—German legal science, and its
6. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
7. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
8. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14 (1974).
9. SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW 210–11 (1941)
10. Samuel Williston, The Case Method of Studying Law, 43 HARV. L. REV. 972,
972 (1930) (book review). For a thoughtful treatment of Williston’s intellectual legacy,
see Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2005).
11. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 610–12
(1908).
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scattered academic partisans (pp. 27–32, 54). Whatever its
salience among the scholarly set in the United States (and even
among academics, Pound’s account was hotly contested (pp. 32–
33)), “mechanical jurisprudence” was an exceptionally poor
description of how most American judges and lawyers thought
about law and adjudication.
Even Pound’s constitutional mechanical bête noire—
12
Lochner v. New York (about which, Pound claimed, “rules have
13
been deduced that obstruct the way of social progress” )—was
interpreted by other leading jurists of the time in exactly the
opposite fashion: the Lochner majority had been aggressive with
the facts, substituting its own interpretation for that of the New
14
York legislature. Lochner instantiated the tyranny of facts, not
mechanical concepts (p. 36). And Justice Holmes’s celebrated
dissent in Lochner, in which Holmes famously thundered against
the constitutionalization of “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social
15
Statics,” was in reality a re-run of nearly identical arguments in
1893 by C.B. Labatt in the American Law Review in response to
a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision striking down legislation
prohibiting mine owners from engaging in various abusive
16
payment practices (p. 78).
Likewise for the doctrine of stare decisis. In Pound’s telling,
the mechanistic quality of jurisprudence had led to slavish
17
obeisance to precedent and the “petrification” of law. But
Tamanaha shows that few, if any, jurists in the formalist era
believed precedent to be inviolable; not even Blackstone held
this view, let alone formalist lawyers like Christopher Tiedeman,
Munroe Smith, or Wilbur Larremore, all of whom plainly
acknowledged that while precedent had its claims, those must
always be balanced by competing, “‘irrepressibl[y] conflict[ing]’”
demands (pp. 38–40).
In sum, late nineteenth century jurists’ displeasure with
legal fictions (pp. 48–49), their keenly felt distinction between
law as ideally conceptualized and law as applied in practice (p.
54), their fretfulness over the perils of legal uncertainty and the
12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. Pound, supra note 11, at 616.
14. For similar historically sensitive treatment of Lochner, see David Bernstein,
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 7–12 (2003).
15. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
16. The similarities are startling, and Tamanaha suggests that there is strong reason
to believe that Holmes would have been familiar with Labatt’s article (221–22 n.91).
17. Pound, supra note 11, at 606.
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rapid proliferation of reported decisional law (pp. 33–36, 55),
their skepticism about mechanical or “deductive” adjudication
(pp. 49–56), and nothing less than their occasional repudiation of
“formalism” itself (pp. 45–48)—Tamanaha brings together all of
these historical theses, supported by evidence from many writers
of the formalist age, thoroughly debunking the exaggerated
18
claims that have been made about it.
Tamanaha does similar complicating work for the legal
realist period. A plain statement of legal realism has always been
rather difficult to pin down. This elusiveness reflects both
significant differences among self-described legal realists even
within the era of their ascendancy and the fact that the realists
sometimes defined themselves negatively, in response to what
they perceived as the formalist bogeyman (p. 71). Yet the fact
that there was no clear-cut manifesto of legal realism does not
mean that there was nothing distinctive about it; there would be
few academic movements at all if cast-iron marching orders were
a requirement. At all events, as an admittedly imprecise
formulation of legal realism, one that surely would provoke
particular intramural disagreements, Tamanaha’s working list of
general characteristics is serviceable:
 “legal rules can be interpreted in various ways and [] how
judges interpret the rules will be a function of their
personal views and the surrounding social forces” (p. 79)
 “one of the main tasks of lawyers is to predict
outcomes . . . [which] cannot be done well by attention to
the rules only” (p. 80)
 “statutes no less than precedents are open to different
interpretations, and judges make law in the course of
applying statutes in particular situations” (p. 80)
 “judges have broad leeway in connection with stare
decisis” (p. 81)
 judges have “substantial freedom” to “select and
characterize the facts upon which the decision is based”
(p. 82)

18. Tamanaha’s evidence is interesting and important, but (as he acknowledges, at
p. 4) he is not the first theorist to make some of these clarifying claims about the
formalist era. For a nuanced treatment along similar lines, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK,
LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 57 (1998).
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 “judges can regularly find legal support for whatever
decision they desire, working backward from the result”
(p. 82)
 “there are gaps in the law—and in these situations judges
try to work out the right outcome, making new law in the
process” (p. 82)
 “when approaching cases judges typically respond to what
they perceive as clusters of fact situations or types” (p. 83)
 “when rendering decisions—interpreting the law,
precedent, and facts—judges are influenced by
subconscious factors” (p. 84)
Tamanaha’s case for debunking even a soft formalist/realist
divide—that is, one which reflects a transition from formalist to
realist thought over several decades—is most powerful with
respect to nineteenth century writers, or at least those who wrote
primarily, if not exclusively, in the late nineteenth century. As
one moves closer to the 1920s and 1930s, the appearance of
realist-sounding statements might be more predictable and
unremarkable; after all, if legal realism was a distinct school of
legal thought, it would likely have had some antecedents and
one would expect to find some evidence of “proto-realism.” It
would be unrealistic to insist on a hard divide from, say, one year
to the next: “Realism did not simply come about overnight; its
19
evolution was, rather, a hesitant one.”
But Tamanaha is alive to this criticism. In each of the nine
cases of prototypical legal realism listed above, he presents
evidence that at least one prominent “formalist” writing before
the year 1900 espoused something very much like the realist
view (pp. 79–84). One still might observe that the fact that one
or two, or even a few, nineteenth century writers made statements here and there that were congruous with certain legal
realist ideas does not indicate anything about either (1) the
representativeness of such statements in the nineteenth
20
century; or (2) the degree of commitment of the speakers
21
Taken
themselves to their realist-sounding statements.
cumulatively, however, Tamanaha’s evidence does a respectable
19. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 72 (1995).
20. Brian Leiter makes similar acute criticisms about representativeness. See Brian
Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is The Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111,
116–17 (2010) (manuscript at 9–10) (reviewing BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE
FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE (2010)).
21. For example, someone might say something off-the-cuff in a speech or minor
writing that was in tension with the bulk of his or her other writing.

!!!DEGIROLAMI-271-VANITYOFDOGMATIZING.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

208

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

12/10/2010 10:50 AM

[Vol. 27:201

job of rebutting the charge of unrepresentativeness or cherrypicking. And as for depth of commitment, Tamanaha might
persuasively respond that he is not out to prove that these earlier
writers were more authentically or devotedly realist than the
writers of the ‘20s and ‘30s. He is only interested in showing that
they were aware of and had themselves expressed similar
insights about law and adjudication. In this, he succeeds.
Just as many legal formalists had embraced many realist
insights, so did many legal realists retain the valuable ideas of
legal formalism, particularly the necessity and healthfulness of
legal rules and principles. Walter Wheeler Cook, Karl Llewellyn,
and Felix Cohen are cited as legal realists who knew the worth of
legal rules and such “steadying factors” as a legal education
focused on the authority of doctrine and its development as well
as the desire of judges to live up to an impartial ideal (pp. 95–
96). Again, Jerome Frank is presented as something of an
impediment to the recognition that most realists were committed
to some moderately formalist beliefs. Frank’s contention that
“the rational element in law is an illusion” and his fixation on
individual judges’ personalities were not shared by fellow realists
(pp. 96–97, 115). Yet it is just these extreme positions—ones
which not even Frank held consistently (p. 98)—which are all22
too-commonly associated with legal realism. “A careful
reading,” writes Tamanaha, “shows that Llewellyn and Frank,
and the rest of those identified as realists, all along recognized
the stabilizing and constraining factors in law” (p. 98). These
were important features of formalist legal theory.
There is an unaddressed question lurking here about why
many in the generation succeeding legal realism overtly
castigated it. Karl Llewellyn, for example, is well known to have
retreated from legal realism in the post-war years, a view
culminating in his decidedly anti-realist remarks in The Common
23
Law Tradition. Tamanaha sometimes relies on this very late
work (1960) as evidence that Llewellyn always believed in
something less full-bloodedly realist than what he had written
earlier (p. 95). But it is not entirely fair to cite a piece thirty
years after the heyday of a period of thought to show that there
was “nothing distinctive” (p. 68, emphasis in original) about that
period; indeed, the language in The Common Law Tradition is at
22. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76
TEX. L. REV. 267, 269 (1997) (“Even among Realists, of course, Frank’s view represented
a particular sort of extreme—as Frank himself recognized.”).
23. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 3–4 (1960).
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least equally consistent with the view that legal realism was a
distinct historical period, features of which later writers (even
writers who had been realists themselves) attacked and
24
rejected. Decades earlier, Lon Fuller, no legal realist he, surely
felt himself to be criticizing something distinctive when he
objected to the “crusade against ‘conceptualism’” of the
25
American legal realist movement, even as he recognized that
“[t]here were, to be sure, premonitions of it as early as the
26
beginning of the present century.” And again later, it was clear
enough to Alexander Bickel that he was praising “[t]he realists,
who were a substantial company of original minds working in a
time of great ferment,” and simultaneously taking aim at certain
strains of “arrested [legal] realism or surrealism would be more
27
accurate.” What were these theorists repenting, commending,
or reacting against, if not legal realism or some variety of it?
Lastly, it is not convincing for Tamanaha to point to the
seemingly serendipitous quality of the arrival of legal realism on
the scene to support the claim that there was nothing distinctive
about these writers as a group (pp. 102–03). Much the same
serendipity attends many historical phenomena whose
distinctiveness is not in doubt.
Despite
these
unresolved
questions,
Tamanaha’s
deconstruction of the more extreme claims made on behalf of
formalism and realism is generally plausible and well
documented. The evidence that Tamanaha brings to bear is
substantial and revealing: the received account is problematic on
a number of fronts and anyone doing future work in this field
must come to terms with Tamanaha’s historical revision.
II
One obvious question is why, given the plentiful evidence
that Tamanaha marshals, the distorted and exaggerated view of
formalism and realism has, and continues to have, such staying
power. Tamanaha offers several explanations for the reasons
that certain standard modes of theoretical and historical
24. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 247–50 (1992). In fairness, Tamanaha also
relies on other earlier work by Llewellyn to raise doubts about his commitment to a more
thoroughgoing legal realism.
25. L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 443 (1934).
26. Id. at 429.
27. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 80–81 (1962).
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narratives achieve prominence and become entrenched. He
claims that histories tend to be written as stock narratives, with
an emphasis on canonical heroes and arch-villains in order to
lend a certain psychological satisfaction to the account (pp. 200–
01). When the narratives are repeated again and again,
generation after generation—and when legal academic citation
protocols reinforce that parroting—the meme becomes not
merely one narrative among many, but the legal theorist’s idea
of reality itself. Thus did the distortions of the likes of Frank,
Gilmore, and Pound achieve authoritative status in later
generations of legal theory and history.
Tamanaha also emphasizes the role of political ideology in
perpetuating the false dichotomy. Progressive scholars in the
1920s and ’30s used “formalism” to smear whatever socioideological view they opposed. The strategic invocation of
formalism was rhetorically effective to pump up various political
and personal agendas. It also had the ideologically salutary effect
of making their political enemies look retrogressive and passé,
but it masked important conceptual similarities between
formalists and realists (pp. 59–63, 84–89). The very same tropes
were welcomed by legal theorists in the 1970s to give scholarly
heft and historical continuity to their “seething skepticism” (p.
61) about the law, all in the service of radical political reform (p.
200). How much more appealing—how much grander—to claim
with evident historical warrant that one was reliving an epic
clash of the titans of American legal theory than to admit that
one was engaged in local, modestly contingent, ideologically
28
motivated policy debates.
Likewise, Tamanaha notes the appeal of dichotomous
historical and theoretical constructions. Clean, tidy, and radically
opposed pairs of intellectual options are easily digested and
regurgitated at need. Deep down, legal historians and theorists
may know well enough, in dark corners that rarely find the light
of the printed page, that reality is more complicated, but the
dichotomies are felt to be useful in pointing up basic intellectual
currents (pp. 120, 201–02). Something like this, Tamanaha

28. For those who might bridle at the seemingly partisan quality of Tamanaha’s
anti-Progressive claims, fear not! He restores the balance with some generously anticonservative sniping at the politicization of the judicial appointments process: “Ronald
Reagan was the first president to systematically screen lower court appointees for their
ideological views. The practice has continued ever since, especially vigorously by
Republican presidents, at the urging and under close scrutiny of conservative and liberal
interest groups” (pp. 152–53).
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argues, explains the binary distortions of attitudinal studies of
judging, the birth of the field of “judicial politics,” and the
profound influence of the work of attitudinalist theorists on the
public’s hunger for easy political explanations of law (pp. 111–
25). Clownish reductions are, in short, helpfully facile; they are
pragmatically useful for the inter-generational inculcation of the
29
gross outlines of academic ideas.
This is an interesting and delightfully bleak perspective on
certain features of the academic enterprise. It is the view that the
natural—indeed, perhaps the inevitable—tendency of a good
30
deal of theoretical scholarship, at least in law, is toward dogma.
Legal theorizing, both as a historical and a philosophical
exercise, moves inexorably toward legal dogmatizing. And the
movement of legal theory toward legal dogma is catalyzed in
each generation of scholarship by the political, professional, and
personal vanities of the theorists themselves. The dogmatization
of reality—its reduction to simplistic distortions, even soundbites (e.g., “mechanical jurisprudence” or “activist judging”)—is
often the way that knowledge is transmitted most effectively and
enduringly.
One might take the view that there is nothing to do or fix
about this situation; putative fixes are themselves only new
distortions. But that is not Tamanaha’s approach. There is
something to do. There is a fix to be had. Because there are
more and less accurate distortions, they ought to be embraced as
they approximate the real and discarded as they veer away from
it. The formalist/realist distortion should be repudiated because
it “obscures more than it clarifies” (p. 202), while his “balanced
realism” is enlightening and normatively attractive.
Balanced realism includes the following propositions; some
are descriptive while others are both descriptive and normative:
 judges’ personalities and beliefs will and should influence
their decisions (what Tamanaha terms “cognitive
framing”), but this is not the same as “willful judging,”
which balanced realism condemns (pp. 187–89)

29. What Tamanaha says about the likely response of attitudinal political scientists
to his charges bespeaks this view: “Quantitative scholars will defend against these
criticisms by saying that the attitudinal and strategic models are just simplified
constructs—they are well aware that judging is more complicated.” (p. 120).
30. Tamanaha himself suggests the possibility that theorists who are wedded to
their academic categories will “dogmatically” reject his evidence. (p. 78)
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 the purposes and consequences of a rule will and should
nearly always “have a bearing” on judicial decisions (p.
189)
 the law is often uncertain, and when it is, a decision will be
“essentially contestable” (p. 190)
 the significance of legally uncertain cases tends to be
substantial (pp. 190–91)
 judges are sometimes confronted with what they think are
“bad rules and bad results,” and their approach to such
bad rules or results is varied (pp. 191–92)
 “hard cases” may be divided into cases involving gaps in
the law and cases involving bad rules or results, but for
either variety, the potential influence of judges’ personal
values is enhanced (p. 192)
 where the law contains an “open provision,” judicial
decisions will not and should not be made in “rule-like
fashion” (p. 192)
 the influence of social factors on adjudication should be
accepted and embraced (pp. 193–94)
 judges are not machines and their prejudices will and
should influence their decisions (p. 194)
 many areas of law are always “in the making” or “under
construction” (pp. 195–96)
 notwithstanding all of the above, judicial decisions are
often rule-based and the institutional quality of judging
“helps hammer out a collective product that is
distinctively legal in a way that transcends” particular
interests (pp. 194–95)
As it happens, balanced realism, Tamanaha believes, is an
accurate description of what most judges in both the formalist
and realist eras were really up to anyway (pp. 68–69, 90, 125–31,
186–87), so history itself can be conscripted to “recover”
balanced realism as a “sound understanding of judging” (p. 3).
Balanced realism is used to unify the views of very different
judges and theorists sometimes separated by centuries: Francis
Lieber, Cooley, Cardozo, Pound, Llewellyn, Richard Posner,
Antonin Scalia, and even Duncan Kennedy—all of them and
many more share a commitment to balanced realism in
adjudication (p. 187). “We are (nearly) all,” Tamanaha seems to
say, “and we have (generally, in our more reflective moments)
always been, balanced realists.”
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It is at this point that Tamanaha is less convincing. First, one
suspects that any theory of adjudication which is sufficiently
capacious to accommodate Antonin Scalia, Richard Posner, and
Duncan Kennedy (to say nothing of all the others) is
overlooking critical distinctions for the sake of an illusory
cohesion. True, at some extremely general level, many theorists
may recognize as a descriptive matter that certain tenets of
realism and formalism in some way affect adjudication. But
while stating these tenets may help to pare away some of the
more dubious and extreme ascriptions that theorists have made
to formalism and realism over the years (something Tamanaha
did with great success in the earlier portions of the book),
Tamanaha has serious normative fish to fry with balanced
realism. On this front, there is a great deal of room for
disagreement left within the borders of balanced realism.
And Tamanaha admits as much: “the general recognition of
balanced realism . . . will not magically dissolve the many
differences that now divide jurists in debates over judicial
decision making” (p. 196). If that is true, then one wonders what
the payoff of balanced realism is as a normative account of
adjudication. Justice Scalia and Judge Posner will have radically
different views about the circumstances in which the purposes
and consequences of a rule should affect a decision, or whether
judges ought to embrace the influence of social factors in
adjudication, or whether many important areas of the law are
“under construction,” or whether “open provisions” should not
be interpreted in “rule-like fashion” (vide the unenumerated
rights of the Constitution), or the extent to which personal
values ought to influence “hard cases,” and so on. What exactly
is gained by grouping Scalia and Posner (and so many others
with their own idiosyncratic and historically contingent views) in
the same balanced realist basket? Tamanaha gives us little
justification for balanced realism as a normative theory of
adjudication. Indeed, because balanced realism is so catholic, it
is difficult to see how he could.
Second, and more importantly, one might have expected
that a book which so assiduously and insightfully illuminates the
illusions of the theoretical enterprise when it trains its sights on
history would follow through on those very insights. A book that
purports to debunk certain scholarly distortions should not
return to the same dry conceptual well after purporting to drain
it. It is true that Tamanaha does not explicitly use the term
“formalism” when he describes balanced realism. At times,
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Tamanaha advocates discarding formalism altogether as a
meaningless concept (pp. 159–67), but really what he attacks
throughout the book are the more implausible features of
formalism—those which have been used as a club to beat up
straw men (e.g., “mechanical jurisprudence,” “deductive
conceptualism”). He is fully in support of a strong sense of strict,
rule-bound decision making (per the last thesis of balanced
realism), and he writes favorably of the notion of “fidelity to
legal texts—constitutions, statutes, and precedents” (p. 178).
To take one context in which the formalist/realist divide
might make a difference, John Manning, whom Tamanaha cites
as a new formalist, has argued that formalism involves the lexical
privileging of the constitutional structure over other methods of
constitutional interpretation: “[B]efore testing whether a default
rule promotes any particular interpretive value, we must first
ascertain whether the Constitution either enjoins or permits the
judiciary to recognize such a value as worthy of
31
promotion . . . .” Anti-formalists might well reject this lexical
prioritization, and that is a legitimate difference—one which
32
survives Tamanaha’s historical clarifications.
In fact, Tamanaha overstates his theoretical claims when he
argues that all meanings of formalism are “empty” (pp. 176–80),
or that self-described “new formalists” can excise the term
without any loss. The overstatement is surprising because
Tamanaha is well-aware of the differences between the new
formalism and anti-formalism; indeed, he compiles a list of seven
salient differences, and he says (rightly) that “[w]hen this cluster
of ideas is taken at the most general level, a broad contrast
among contemporary jurists can be drawn between those
identified as formalists and their opponents” (p. 179). Why isn’t
that enough to preserve the divide? That these new formalists
and anti-formalists may reject “exaggerated” (p. 179) claims
does not mean that there are no non-exaggerated differences

31. John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 685, 686 (1999); see also id. at 692. An anti-formalist would not give any lexical
priority to a text where it produced a result contrary to what the anti-formalist believed
was the overall policy of the legislation; he would adapt the text to its “real” purpose.
The formalist would reject this approach. See id. at 694–95.
32. For reasons which will appear shortly, the neo-formalist example selected here
is drawn from constitutional law, but there has been at least a mild neo-formalist
renaissance in contract law as well which in some ways parallels the rise of moderate
jurisprudential neo-formalism. See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of
Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1529, 1530–31 (2002) (reviewing THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)).
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between them. Likewise, the fact that Tamanaha purports to
incorporate these various moderate formalist theses into
balanced realism does not mean that he has stripped formalism
of any legitimate content. He has simply subsumed it. Perhaps
Tamanaha still can make the case for junking the term
“formalism” for pragmatic reasons (e.g., because by this point
the term itself is confusing, given its history), but this is merely a
matter of picking names. Conceptually, balanced realism is still
committed to formalism.
In light of his ostensible aim to debunk the “formalist-realist
divide,” Tamanaha’s backslide to “balanced realism” as
normative prescription—a bit of formalism and a bit of realism,
in appropriately “balanced” moderation—is confounding. The
confusion is especially acute because Tamanaha at one point
says that, like formalism, realism is also “empty of theoretical
content” (p. 180). But Tamanaha is unlikely to believe that
realism is empty, or at least as empty as he claims formalism to
be, since that would reduce “balanced realism” to the rather
unassuming state of “balanced emptiness.”
The mystifying backslide to “balanced realism” requires
some unpacking: it might be interpreted in two very different
ways. The claim here is not that Tamanaha himself interprets his
balanced realist project in these terms, but that his appeal to
balanced realism powerfully reflects one approach to the
intersection of history and legal theory, while the nature of his
historical evidence actually might suggest a very different
approach to that intersection.
First, the appeal to balanced realism might mean that there
is at bottom something essentially true about formalism and
realism—something which, once scrubbed clean of its dubious
features, is inescapable. If this were so, Tamanaha’s injunction to
discard or get “beyond the formalist-realist divide” would be
nothing of the sort. To the contrary, it would be a reaffirmation
of some hybrid of these shopworn categories as intrinsic to
theorizing about these issues. The perfect account of law or
adjudication (or both) would represent some philosophical blend
of the foundational categories of formalism and realism, and it
would be up to legal scholars to hunt that elusive beast down.
Once we accepted that bits of both formalism and realism were
necessary to construct the ultimate normative theory, it would
also become clear how much we actually had in common with
our theoretical antagonists. The scales of academic distortion
would then be lifted from our eyes, as Tamanaha has lifted them
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in this book. We can call this the metaphysical interpretation of
Tamanaha’s appeal to balanced realism. Likewise, we can call
this general approach to legal theory—one which displays these
characteristics—the metaphysical mode of legal theory.
Alternatively, Tamanaha’s balanced realism backslide might
suggest that Tamanaha has not followed through on the
implications of his historical evidence. That is, the solution to the
many deficiencies of legal scholarship that the book identifies is
not to construct a better distortion (“balanced realism”), and
continue blindly on the very same trajectory as the vain
dogmatizers of the past—enlisting history in the service of
theoretical perfection. The solution is instead to abandon the
yearning for distortion altogether. One certainly could continue
to talk about formalism and realism as a loosely related
hodgepodge of dispositions or moods to which this or that figure,
33
today or in the past, shows variable affinity. One could describe
historically inflected varieties of formalism and realism—strains
of formalism and realism which were particularly influential at
distinct historical moments in American law—and one could
praise or condemn a decision in which formalist or realist
reasoning was used to reach a particular outcome. But one
would have no grander aspirations for these categories, no vain
desire to conceive the ultimate normative judicial or legal theory.
The future for legal theory would lie not in devising still more
philosophical abstractions of the perfect jurisprudential account,
but in the careful study of the history of ideas and how various
theories of law or adjudication affected, or are likely to affect,
particular legal controversies. We can call this the historicist
interpretation, and similarly we can call this general approach to
legal theory the historicist mode.
III
The movement of legal theory in either the metaphysical or
historicist direction might have powerful implications not only
for the formalist/realist debates but also for scholarship in other
legal disciplines. Constitutional theory is perhaps an obvious
example, and it is worth a small excursion to consider how the

33. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An
Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 170 (2006) (“As it has developed over
the years, American legal realism is as much a mood as a set of doctrines.”); DUXBURY,
supra note 19, at 68 (“Emphasis is placed instead on what can only be described as the
‘feel’ of realism as an intellectual tendency . . . .”).
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metaphysical and historicist modes might affect a particularly
prominent scholarly disagreement: the contest between
34
originalism and living constitutionalism.
A cursory recapitulation: Originalism is the collective name
for a cluster of theories of constitutional interpretation all of
which in different ways rely on historical materials—chiefly
those that attended the Constitution’s ratification in 1789 and
35
the approval of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 —to
understand the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions. While
early originalists were said to champion a variation that
emphasized the framers’ intentions in enacting the particular
36
provision at issue, current originalists often (but not always)
look instead to the original meaning that a particular
constitutional provision would have had for the founding
generation. The evidence for such original meaning is broad,
consisting of everything from the constitutional text itself, to
canonical documents such as The Federalist Papers, to the
debates at the Constitutional Convention, to the views of the
individual state ratifiers, to the ways in which a particular
locution or turn of phrase might have applied and been
understood by a hypothetical audience in other constitutional
37
provisions or contemporaneous legal contexts, and so on.
The major competitor to originalism of whatever variety has
38
generally gone under the name of “nonoriginalism” or “living
39
constitutionalism.” An important part of what distinguishes
34. Tamanaha’s book does not focus on constitutional theory, but I consider it here
because constitutional theory dominates jurisprudential discussion today.
35. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The
Rise of the Non-Establishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1088 (1995) (arguing that
it is to the period in which the Establishment Clause was incorporated against the
states—that is, the mid-19th century—that originalists ought to look to locate its public
meaning).
36. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 145 (1990) (“If the
Constitution is law, then presumably its meaning, like that of all other law, is the meaning
the lawmakers were understood to have intended.”). For well-known criticisms of
original intentions originalism, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
37. I am bypassing vast oceans of theoretical work on originalism at light speed.
This is regrettable but it does not particularly affect my speculations about how the
metaphysical or historicist modes in legal scholarship might impact these issues.
38. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: VOLUME 1:
FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 12 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737
(2007); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 353 (2007). I set to the side arguments to distinguish non-originalism from
living constitutionalism. Mitchell Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24
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living constitutionalists from originalists is that the former
“simply do not privilege history . . . in constitutional
interpretation. They don’t necessarily sideline text, history, and
structure; these are just parts of the motley constellation that is
40
constitutional interpretation.” The dispute between living
constitutionalists and originalists is too complex to go into in
great detail, and there is a real question whether it survives the
ecumenism of the so-called new originalism (more on this
below). Some former opponents of originalism have recently
reversed course and become “compatibilist” supporters of the
41
new originalism, reflecting the degree to which the aspiration to
constrain judges’ power, which was the centerpiece of paleooriginalism, bears an uncertain relationship to the new
42
originalism. Others continue to fly the living constitutionalist
43
flag.
There is little doubt that originalism has powerful affinities
with formalism, at least when the subject is the ever-fraught
terrain of the interpretation of unenumerated rights. And the
same might be said for the instrumental qualities of legal realism
and living constitutionalism. Lawrence Solum usefully describes
the relationship of the former:
[T]he core of contemporary originalism is the idea that the
Constitution should be interpreted in light of the original
public meaning of the constitutional text. That core idea
appeals to formalists because (as compared with the
alternatives), it seems to provide a method for reducing
disagreement about constitutional meaning. To the extent
that the Supreme Court’s unenumerated rights cases require a

n.52 (2009).
40. Leib, supra note 39, at 358.
41. Jack Balkin is an example. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion]; Jack M.
Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427,
432–36 (2007); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 166 (Ill. Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 07-24, Nov. 22, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
42. See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism as Jujitsu, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 521, 527 (2009)
(reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE (2007)) (“Today, most
originalists have moved away from instrumentalist justifications like ‘judicial restraint,’
and instead tend to ground the originalist enterprise on the normative theory of popular
sovereignty.”).
43. See Leib, supra note 39; see also SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
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more latitudinarian approach to constitutional interpretation,
44
formalists will be suspicious.

To say that there is an affinity is not to suggest an identity of
outlook: one can certainly be an originalist and reject the
formalist’s respect for horizontal stare decisis, especially if the
precedent in question used an overtly non-originalist
methodology to reach its result—if, say, it was insufficiently
45
deferential to the relevant constitutional text or history.
Nevertheless, the notion that the textual “form” and historical
“form(ation)” of the Constitution ought to be a constraining
46
force on the discretion of judges to decide cases —rather than
merely one non-binding factor among many in reaching the best
outcome—distinguishes originalists from their opponents.
How might adopting the metaphysical mode in legal theory
affect the originalist/living constitutionalist debate? That is,
could we think about originalism and living constitutionalism in
a way that analogizes from Tamanaha’s reconstruction of and
normative pitch for balanced realism from the shards of
formalism and realism as foundational, inevitable categories of
legal theory? The first stage would be the view that there is, in
fact, something inescapable in defining our normative
constitutional possibilities in the dichotomous categories of
originalism and living constitutionalism. These constitutional
interpretive outlooks are essential, fundamental, and those
academics who work in the realm of constitutional theory are
consigned to join one team and do ideological battle with the
other. That is simply the way constitutional theory gets done.
This first stage of the metaphysical mode was reached years
ago. It is reflected in the decades-long fights about what was
essentially a political question: originalists were exercised about
44. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9. U. PA. J. CONST. L.
155, 163 (2006); see also Paul Horwitz, Judicial Character (and Does It Matter), 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 97, 102 (2009) (book review) (“In its strongest form, the legalist model is
often identified with formalist and, in the constitutional field, originalist judges like
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.”).
45. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting
Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005).
46. Mitchell Berman has described this view as splintering into two possible
subtypes: the position that original meaning should be the sole object of interpretation;
and the position that original meaning should be given “lexical priority,” but that other
meanings can be considered if original meaning does not resolve the issue. Berman,
supra note 39, at 10. I am doubtful about how many contemporary originalists hold to the
former view.
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what they perceived as judicial excesses; living constitutionalists
celebrated those very same decisions. Because of the political
nature of the fight and the polarities that it sometimes embraced
and continues to embrace, it is the kind of debate that can
capture the public’s political imagination. It can be understood
by non-specialists and showcased in, say, judicial confirmation
hearings (Robert Bork’s, for example, and to a lesser degree,
Elena Kagan’s), where the phrase “judicial philosophy” has now
47
become a not very mysterious code for judicial methodology.
First-stage originalism may not have many scholarly defenders
any longer but, as Jamal Green has elegantly shown, it still
commands the attention and approbation of a significant
48
segment of the population, judges included. In this first stage,
the common-sense simplicity of the originalist/living
constitutionalist divide has an appealing Manichean quality that
fosters and perpetuates it. It can reach and influence the public’s
49
political cerebral cortex ; it is a user-friendly distortion, just in
the way that formalism and realism (at least pre-Tamanaha)
have often been.
The second stage of the metaphysical mode would in one
sense reflect a moderating touch. It would introduce conceptual
nuance to support the claim that there is some theoretically
complex middle road between originalism and living
constitutionalism which represents the best of all possible
worlds. The distance between originalism and living
constitutionalism would thus be narrowed considerably, at least
for those scholars laboring in the fields of constitutional theory.
Former enemies could now come together with the aim of
relocating their disagreements within a single, somewhat murky,
constitutional interpretive method, in which original meaning
was consulted and given its due, but because of the
underdeterminate quality of many constitutional provisions (the
ones people usually fight about), other interpretive tools would
be necessary. Those on the outside of the treaty between the
warring camps would be viewed as recalcitrant fringe figures, or
47. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 98–100 (2007).
48. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 681–82, 690 (2009).
49. See id. at 690 (“A second outgrowth of the originalism movement of the 1970s
and 1980s is increased public attention to constitutional methodology generally and to
originalism in particular.”); see also Dawn Johnsen, The Progressive Political Power of
Balkin’s “Original Meaning,” 24 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 418 (2007) (“[O]riginalism’s
enormous influence has come less as a theory of jurisprudence than as a highly
persuasive political ideology that inspires passionate political engagement.”).
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simply people who did not realize that the turbid middle had
already absorbed whatever was legitimate in their views. After
all, almost everyone agrees that original meaning ought to figure
in somewhere in our theories of adjudication, just as nearly
everyone can agree that the consequences of a rule ought
somehow to make a difference to a rule’s adoption (p. 189). As
the approaches began to merge, articles with such titles as
50
“Living Originalism” would begin to appear. In many ways, we
have reached the second stage of the metaphysical mode as well.
We might even re-describe the new, big-tent originalism in
Tamanaha’s locution—as the arrival of “balanced originalism.”
Indeed, it may be that Tamanaha’s appeal to balanced realism
represents just this second stage of the metaphysical mode in the
formalist/realist debate.
The third stage of the metaphysical mode would be
51
characterized by fragmentation. Thomas Colby and Peter Smith
have ably documented this feature of contemporary originalist
discourse, but the upshot is that rather than representing
anything like a single, unified “best” account of constitutional
interpretation, the middle-way, big tent approach of the new
originalism invariably resulted in fission. The big tent simply
could not accommodate all comers. Philosophical sophistication
begat a kind of hyper-refined scholasticization of originalism,
spawning the categories of original subjective meaning, original
objective-public-meaning textualism (which itself fragments into
Randy Barnett’s “presumption of liberty” variety, Michael
Perry’s moral reading of the crucial underdeterminate
provisions, Lawrence Solum’s “semantic originalism,” and likely
others), original intent (Larry Alexander’s sophisticated version,
for example), original expected-application, “common law
52
53
originalism,” and the “method of text and principle,” in which
“each generation of Americans can seek to persuade each other
about how the text and its underlying principles should apply to
50. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239
(2009). The varieties of originalism that I offer below are drawn from Colby and Smith’s
article.
51. See JONATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 190–205 (2005) (“Much of academic constitutional theory in
the 1990s was devoted to elaborating, refining, coopting, or attacking originalism. In the
process, originalism became a more subtle, complex, and fragmented doctrine.”). What
O’Neill describes as a single movement toward splintering, I think may be better
characterized as an almost seamless transition from an illusory unity to fragmentation.
52. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV.
551 (2006).
53. Balkin, Abortion, supra note 41, passim.
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their circumstances, their problems, their grievances.” “[T]here
are today countless variations of originalism,” explain Colby and
Smith, “and the differences among them are sometimes so stark
55
that it is difficult to treat them as one coherent methodology.”
56
Once the question, “Are we all originalists now?” was asked
and answered affirmatively by a growing chorus of scholars,
57
doom was not far off.
In one sense, the growing philosophical complexity and
granularity of originalism was an enormously positive
development: in the hands of thoughtful and careful scholars,
originalism was stripped of its dubious rhetorical excesses and
imbued with theoretical bona fides. But in another sense, it was
a serious loss. Originalism now became the exclusive province of
the constitutional theorist; it no longer had any claim on the
public as a live subject of debate, and it became increasingly
difficult to implement by judges, at least those who were not
extremely well-versed in the latest state-of-the-art conceptual
advances. Steven Smith perceptively observes:
However the case may be for law generally, though, or for
philosophy, for originalism exclusion [of non-theorists] has to
be counted as a cost, I think—and a significant one. After all,
originalism is supposed to be an approach that actual lawyers
and judges can employ in deciding actual cases. So if the
approach becomes so conceptually cumbersome that only a
theoretical elite can fully understand and participate in it,
58
then what good is originalism?

54. Id.
55. Colby & Smith, supra note 50, at 245.
56. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV.
10 (2007), (noting the prevalence of the question, though inclining toward a negative
answer); Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great Divorce: The
Current Understanding of the Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the
Incompatibility Clause, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 135 (2008),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/GreatDivorce.pdf (Tillman, Opening Statement) (“If there was any doubt before, there can be no doubt now, post-Heller, we are all
originalists now—at least those of us who wish to remain relevant and within the
mainstream of our ever-evolving judicial culture.”); Sanford Levinson, The Limited
Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Performance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 495, 496 (1996) (“[W]e are all originalists.”).
57. See Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism 1 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 10-232, 2010) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1567702 (“Hands have been wrung,
voices raised, and much ink spilled over the question of whether, to paraphrase Jefferson,
we are all now originalists.”).
58. Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism 9 (Univ. San Diego Sch. Law,
Research Paper No. 08-028, June 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1150447.
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Something analogous might be said for Tamanaha’s use of the
psychologically abstruse notion of “cognitive framing” to explain
the real import of the influence of judicial personality on
59
adjudication (pp. 187–89). If we are interested in “balanced
realism” as a normative theory of adjudication—one which we
hope can at least to some extent guide and constrain judges—
then much depends, Tamanaha says, on whether a judge’s
subconscious inclinations lead her to (benign) “framing” or
(malign) “willful judging” (pp. 187–88). But since these two
modes of adjudication often “can shade into one another”
(p. 188), it seems that we will need to subject our judge to an
extensive battery of training in cutting-edge psychological
research (or psychotherapy?) and cognition theory in order to
60
stand a chance of distinguishing between the two. Otherwise,
only the experts will be able to tell the difference.
Be that as it may—and because my aim here is really to
consider legal scholarship and not adjudication—the run-away
quality of originalism’s ecumenism would elicit efforts to delimit
it, to cabin and pin down originalism’s core claims; to “strong”
views, for example, that bear a resemblance to the position held
61
in the first stage (but which few scholars now hold ), and which
62
could then be debunked. But even that descriptive core would
be disputed by other theorists with their own originalist core
63
commitments. The eventual result would be that the big tent
would be torn asunder and while the label “originalism” would
continue to be plausibly assigned to any of its constituent
theories, there would cease to be any unifying normative vision
59. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) (arguing that
courts should take steps to cleanse their decisions of “cognitive biases” using the
techniques of social psychology).
60. It is unlikely that a judge’s “sincerity” can bear the weight that Tamanaha
demands of it in distinguishing between “framing” and “willfulness.” The distinction
between framing and willfulness can be quite fine and self-delusion might well obliterate
it.
61. Even original expected-application theorists such as John McGinnis and
Michael Rappaport do not claim that the original expected applications of the
constitutional text should be the exclusive interpretive target; they are simply nonexclusive evidence of original meaning. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport,
Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371,
379 (2007).
62. Berman, supra note 39, at 18–20 (“Originalism proper is strong originalism—the
thesis that original meaning is the only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation or
that it has at least lexical priority over any other candidate meanings . . . .”).
63. See, e.g., the attempt by Solum to defend a core of originalism in what he calls
the “semantic content” of the Constitution. Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and
Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 411 (2009).
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for originalism. Constitutional theorists would tend to their
respective normative vineyards, each of them developing their
own “best” accounts of originalism, each of them claiming that
something like their own version ought to control, and each of
them enlisting history to serve their purposes and “empower”
64
their socio-political allies. In this way, the fundamental
categories of originalism and living constitutionalism would be
fixed in amber as a subject of speculative academic study and
65
contestation. If we have not reached the third stage yet, we are
not too far from it.
It is not my intention in the least to disparage this way of
proceeding. There is value in continuing to parse and distinguish,
to slice finer and more elegant cuts of originalism, to claim
theoretical and political preeminence for each as they come and
go, and to enlist history as an aid in shoring up those prescriptive
claims. This is the way that many non-originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation have been developed and
championed—perhaps the arch-example being Ronald
Dworkin’s “right answer” approach and its use of legal history as
66
the handmaid of theory. There is no question that as a result
our normative theories of the Constitution have become more
philosophically rich.
But I do want at least to suggest—not an alternative,
exactly, but another course for legal scholarship, one which I will
67
call a historicist possibility. This is not the place to offer a fully
64. Dawn Johnsen conjectures giddily about the “progressive political power” that
Jack Balkin’s origino-revisionist interpretation of Roe v. Wade might portend. Johnsen,
supra note 49, at 418 (“Progressives will benefit from Abortion and Original Meaning
. . . . As they read, they will feel their spirits soar and at times will silently (perhaps
audibly) cheer.”).
65. See O’NEILL, supra note 51, at 204–05 (“Although these recent developments
add nuance and sophistication to originalism, they also bespeak a certain fragmentation
and diffusion of the originalist project into possibly incompatible versions. Careful
historical recovery and philosophical grounding of originalism are more complicated and
perhaps more divisive tasks than the critique that particular decisions or doctrines of the
Warren and Burger Courts bore little readily discernible relationship to the original
meaning of the Constitution.”).
66. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279–90 (1977).
67. The eminent historian of philosophy Frederick Beiser has cautioned that
anyone who uses the term “historicism” “enters an intellectual minefield.” Frederick
Beiser, Historicism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 155,
174 (Brian Leiter & Michael Rosen eds., 2007). One of the many dangers, Beiser writes,
is that historicism:
has acquired opposing meanings because it has been used to refer to
diametrically opposed views of history. According to one view, the purpose of
history is to know the general laws or ends of history; its aim is to find the
system or unity behind the chaos of the past. According to the other view, the
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developed theory of historicism in constitutional theory, and
only some sketchy outlines will be presented here. The key
difference is that the approach to legal scholarship in the
historicist mode would require that we forsake the aspiration to
devise the ultimate constitutional interpretive theory. The
historicist theorist would recognize that a wide variety of
theories of constitutional interpretation exist, each with its
advantages and drawbacks. He would be sensitive to the ways in
which these competing theories had been used in the past to
ground and justify certain outcomes. He could describe
originalism and living constitutionalism as an agglomeration of
loosely-related dispositions or moods (rather than hard-edged
normative programs), composed of numerous strands of
sometimes incompatible arguments, to which this or that figure
might more or less closely adhere. And he would analyze how
these rivals, or some combination of them, might be used by
courts to decide future cases.
Admittedly, taking up the historicist mode might well entail
a bit less normative constitutional theory than is now
fashionable, at least of a certain kind. This is something of a
virtue, though it is not often regarded as such by constitutional
68
theorists. It is the virtue of stopping short, of withholding final
normative judgment about the lessons of history. It is the
conscious decision not to write “Part III” of the law review
article, in which the problems of history are resolved decisively
with the neat and tidy coup de grace represented by the “unified
theory.” The virtue of stopping short is characterized by
prescriptive and methodological reserve—not disinterest, but a
distinctly conservative reticence—in the face of historical
complication.
When constitutional theory confronts constitutional history,
the historicist mode is well-suited to interpreting past legal
conflicts and historical figures with particular attention to the
social concerns and problems out of which they grew. This is not
to say that legal history with an explicitly metaphysical
purpose of history is to know the individual, to plumb the depths of the unique
and the singular, through exacting detailed research; it rejects the possibility of
discovering general laws or ends of history.
Id. In using the term “historicism” here, I do not mean to appeal directly to the
philosophical program in nineteenth century German philosophy that Beiser describes. I
am not expert in that literature and it would be anachronistic and intellectually
presumptuous to attach myself to that rich philosophical school. Nevertheless, it is fair to
say that I intend something much closer to the latter meaning of historicism.
68. I owe this way of putting it to Samuel Bray.
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orientation—that is, an orientation which proceeds by way of
apology, attempting to explain historical events as fitting or not
fitting a particular premeditated theoretical construct—cannot
69
be careful, edifying, and exceptionally well done. Indeed, most
historical inquiry proceeds along the lines of explaining events
by recourse to some organizing meta-principle or idea, and there
is no reason at all to exclude originalism and living
constitutionalism from the range of possible organizing concepts.
The point is merely that it might be refreshing to see more
work by constitutional theorists whose very purpose for being
was not to justify or condemn a particular legal event according
to originalist or living constitutionalist premises. Such efforts
would not work backwards from history strategically to reach
the authors’ own brand of originalism or living
constitutionalism—with the result that one could conscript
history to buttress the perfect theory of the Constitution. History
would not be used to justify or condemn contemporary theories
of interpretation, or as an instrument to “bash” theoretical rivals
70
in the contest for methodological supremacy.
For example, Professor Balkin’s originalist apology for Roe
v. Wade is as deft and clever a revisionist account as one is likely
to see, one which he intends as a weapon to pierce his now
intramural
methodological
rivals.
Balkin’s
originalist
reconstruction of Roe is meant explicitly to serve the “larger
purpose of . . . demonstrat[ing] why the debate between
originalism and living constitutionalism rests on a false
71
dichotomy.” Using the originalism of the “method of text and
principle,” Balkin is able to recharacterize what scores of
scholars have deemed the poster-child of living constitutionalist
adjudication as actually, truly, originalist, assuming that
originalism is understood aright. Yet it ought to surprise no one
that Balkin’s originalist opponents (those who subscribe to very
different originalist premises) would parry his thrust with the
claim that the “method of text and principle” originalism—which
embraces the power of social movements as agents of change in

69. Michael McConnell’s reconstruction of Brown v. Board of Education along
originalist lines, for example, is a remarkable achievement and a model of careful
historical scholarship in the metaphysical mode. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and
the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).
70. Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 272 (1997) (“Each school of
contemporary constitutional thought claims Dred Scott embarrasses rival theories.”).
71. Balkin, Abortion, supra note 41, at 292.
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constitutional meaning—could be used just as effectively to
justify Lochner v. New York:
We cannot help but also point out that Balkin’s method of
interpreting the text in light of meaning that social
movements bestow on it may well justify Lochner as well as
Roe. The free labor movement that began in the midnineteenth century suggested that the right to contract was an
72
essential liberty.

It is something of a surprise, however, that one of the most
brilliant and distinctly historicist treatments of Lochner was
written by none other than Balkin himself just a few years before
73
his piece on abortion. Indeed, Balkin’s historical analysis of the
way in which Lochner has regularly been used strategically by
successive generations of legal academics to condemn or praise
contemporary legal theories to which those scholars had pledged
allegiance (e.g., the claim by John Hart Ely that Roe represented
illegitimate “Lochnering,” and contrary claims with mirrorimage motivations a generation later) embodies a deeply
74
historicist ethic : “Political agitation and social movement
activism, followed by successful elections and judicial
appointments change constitutional common sense,” and in the
process, “both critics and defenders found new uses for
75
Lochner.”
Balkin concludes that if Lochner was wrongly decided, “it
will not be for any of the reasons that we law professors
continually offer for why it was wrongly decided,” but because
the judges who actually decided it did not make the fullest use of
“the tools of understanding that their legal culture offered
76
them.” This claim matches up nicely with Tamanaha’s evidence
about the way in which Lochner was generally received (pace
Pound) as a piece of legal craft when it was decided. And what is
true for Lochner should be true for Roe: that is, historical
treatments of Roe by constitutional theorists should not be the
exclusive province of interpretive methodologists with
contemporary normative axes to grind.
One advantage of adopting the historicist mode might be
that it would allow those constitutional theorists who approach
72. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 61, at 380 n.13.
73. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677 (2005).
74. Id. at 688–92.
75. Id. at 702–03.
76. Id. at 725.
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historical events and figures to confront them more forthrightly,
particularly when those histories represent dark points in
American history. Owning up to the painful truth that the
Constitution has been enlisted by what were likely well-meaning
and committed theorists and judges to support political and
social programs that are widely deemed moral failures is useful
for a clear-eyed and realistic view to the problem of the
77
possibility of constitutional evil, in the past and today.
A quite different but perhaps even more important benefit
would be distinctly normative: historicism leads to the possibility
of acknowledging the costs of methodological commitment. For
any given approach to constitutional interpretation is attended
by gain and loss, and crowning any single theory king masks the
degree to which the loss and sacrifice of values represents a
78
pervasive feature of constitutional law. Even worse than this—
methodological fidelity sometimes demands the commitment to
making real sacrifice appear either unimportant or a positive
good.
Taking the historicist mode would permit a more nuanced
view of historical events, and it would entail the belief that there
likely exists a legitimate and reasonably broad range of plausible
outcomes in any given case: not just “off the wall” or undeniably
correct but a gray zone of legitimacy in between, using a variety
79
of historically contingent interpretive approaches. As time
passes, the plausible range of interpretive possibilities may shift,
but this is not to say that the range is infinite or even everexpanding. It will always be controlled—by the tether of
80
doctrinal and social history.
“Constitutional theory—both normative and positive,”
Michael Klarman once wrote, would “benefit from a substantial
81
dose of historicism.” This is especially true whenever
77. Mark Graber has developed similar arguments against both originalist and
“perfectionist” constitutional theories. MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
78. For more on this issue, as well as the development of a particular style of
historicism in constitutional interpretation, see Marc O. DeGirolami, Tragic Historicism:
A Theory of Religious Liberty (on file with author).
79. Balkin, supra note 73, at 717.
80. On the former, see Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the
Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277–82 (2005) (arguing that if
we were really interested in judicial restraint, we would favor a strong theory of
precedential constraint far more than originalism, because the norms of precedent are
“thicker,” the raw materials of precedent far more accessible, and the style of reasoning
much more familiar to lawyers and judges).
81. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
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constitutional theory engages (as it always must) with
constitutional history.
***
The contrast between the metaphysical and historicist
modes of legal scholarship leads us directly back to Brian
Tamanaha’s book. Can we turn the analogy to constitutional
theory back onto his formalist/realist divide? If the analogy is
persuasive, there is reason to think that Tamanaha has embraced
the metaphysical mode: he is chasing down an ideal theory, and
he is conscripting history to shore up his arguments for balanced
realism. But as sophisticated and inclusive a theory as balanced
realism may be, it is unlikely to win the prize he seeks for it, at
least for any fixed term. Indeed, and ironically, the nature of the
historical evidence that Tamanaha uncovers and the pungency of
his criticisms of the legal theoretical enterprise when it sets its
sights on history are themselves tacit, but powerful, arguments
for historicism in scholarly discussion of the formalist/realist
divide. That would manifest the virtue of stopping short.
Yet it is well to conclude with praise. These reservations
about the balanced realism prescription should not be read to
detract in any way from the genuine achievements of this book.
In it, Brian Tamanaha shows himself to be a fair-minded
scholar—intellectually, a straight shooter. The book that he has
produced—careful, devastating in its criticisms, eye-opening in
the evidence that it uncovers—is an authentic reflection of those
admirable qualities and is well worth reading by anyone with an
interest in jurisprudence and American legal history. It is, in all,
a credit to an institution all too often bedeviled and beguiled by
the vicious charms of vanity.

Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1935 (1995).

